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Abstract 
The ethics perspective which I shall focus on in this chapter is necessarily 
founded on Stein’s investigations about the human spiritual dimension, in 
which her phenomenological and metaphysical-theological research are syn-
thetized. Stein describes the human being as “essentially spiritual”, namely 
intellect and will. In fact, he can comprehend reality in its “meaning” (Sinn) 
and act freely in it. The ethical consequences of Stein’s anthropological 
reflections will be explained through what we shall call “moral interiority”. 
Following Augustine, Stein perceives the original consciousness of oneself 
(interiority) as “an inner place, not a place” (interiore loco, non loco), where 
to start explaining intellective knowledge, and most of all free acting and 
consequently ethics. Action is not just expressed outwards, and is first of 
all self-actuation – acting and being are mutually implied. The direction of 
moral actions is thus already present in the ‘essence’ (Wesen) of each individ-
ual and this essence, thanks to the creative ‘essentiality’ (Wesenheiten), is ab 
eterno in the Logos. In view of this complex theological node, the purpose of 
this essay is to show how we can say, with Stein, that Christ incarnates the 
only possible ethics.
Keywords: Edith Stein, phenomenological anthropology, essence, meaning, 
Logos, interiority, ethic.
1. The human spiritual dimension 
1.1 Essentiality, essence and actual-real being
My investigation starts from the study of a particularly delicate topic, to which Stein has devoted much time and energy: the issue of essence. 
It is a fundamental and much articulated topic, a crossover between phe-
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nomenology and scholastic philosophy, both of which were the object of 
study by Edith Stein throughout her life. The purpose of Husserl’s phe-
nomenology is the «return to essence», an issue that dates back to Greek 
philosophy and is an important part of all Christian tradition. Edith Stein 
perceives such continuity in the Greek term eidoς used by Husserl himself 
and synthetically elaborates the problem, providing an original and per-
sonal interpretation1. In Finite and Eternal Being, Stein specifically focuses 
on it, albeit avoiding the term idea (eidoς) - which from Plato onwards 
generated conflicts and ambiguities – and prefers to use the German term 
Wesenheit2. The starting point is always the life of the ego as it emerges from 
a phenomenological study. The experiential units (Erlebniseinheiten), resulting 
from the trascendental reduction, are a flow of Erlebnisse which manifest 
continuously one after the other, but they have a stable foundation, which 
according to Stein consists of essentialities (Wesenheiten). She writes:  
Unless essentialities (wesenheit) were realized in the life of the 
Ego, this latter world be a chaotic maze in which no formal 
structure whatever could be distinguished. It is the essen-
tialities which impart to the life of the ego unity and multi-
plicity, organic articulate structure and order, meaning and 
intelligibility. Sense (der Sinn) and intelligibility: actually we are 
face to face here with the primordial source of all sense and 
intelligibility. For what is sense (Sinn) (logoς)? What does this 
word signify? We are unable to define or explain it because it 
is itself the ultimate ground (Grund) or reason of all definitions 
and explications. All human speech rests on the certainty that 
words have a meaning, and every explanation and argument 
rests on the convinction that all our questioning and reasoning 
arrives in the end at an ultimate intelligible reason or ground. 
1  Cf. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und einer phänomenologis-
chen Philosophie, «Husserliana» III/1, Karl Schuman (Hrsg.) (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1976). In this work, Husserl speaks about “Wesenswissenschaft”. Differently from Logische 
Untersuchungen, to evoide misunderstandings, he does not use any more the term “idea”, 
but rather the German word “Wesen” or the greek one “eidos”: «Vielleicht nicht ganz so 
schlimm hinsichtlich beirrender Vieldeutigkeiten steht es mit den Ausdrücken I d e e und 
I d e a l, aber im ganzen doch schlimm genug, wie mir die häufigen Mißdeutungen meiner 
“Logischen Untersuchungen” empfindlich genug gemacht haben. Zu einer Änderung der 
Terminologie bestimmt mich auch das Bedürfnis, den höchst wichtigen K a n t i s c h e n  B eg r 
i ff  d e r  I d e e von dem allgemeinen Begriffe des (formalen oder materialen) Wesens reinlich 
geschieden zu erhalten. Ich benutze daher als Fremdwort das terminologisch unverbrauchte 
E i d o s , als deutsches Wort das mit ungefährlichen, gelegentlich allerdings ärgerlichen 
Äquivokationen behaftete “W e s e n”». (ibid., p. 6). Cf. Angela Ales Bello, Introduzione a 
Edith Stein, La ricerca della verità. Dalla fenomenologia alla filosofia cristiana, a cura di Angela 
Ales Bello (Roma: Città Nuova Editrice, 1993), 14.
2  Cf. Edith Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, (Whashington: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 
2002), 65; differently from this translation, I will use the term “essence” for Wesen and 
“essentiality” for Wesenheit. 
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This ultimate ground is the sense [der Sinn], intelligible in itself 
and throught itself. Meaning and understanding belong together. 
Meaning is what can be understood, and understanding is the 
grasping of meaning (Sinnerfassen). To understand (verstehen) 
what is intelligible (Verstehbare) is the precise nature or being 
of the human spirit (eigentlichste Sein des Geistes) which for this 
reason is also called intellectus3.
So the human’s intellectual-spiritual dimension does not create a meanin-
ing (Logos) for what is real, but, on the contrary, it grasps meaning in the 
reality, which is therefore intelligible for it. Here Stein reclaims the Christian 
metaphysical tradition and the classic distinction between ratio and intel-
lectus. The first one is a logical or rational connection procedure , while the 
second is «resting in the understanding of the ultimate meaning»4. Thus, the 
essentialities play a key role: simple, independent of time and change, they 
represent the ultimate meaning, the intelligible itself. They are not real-ac-
tual, but without them the real world would not be. The becoming real, in 
fact, is understandable to us only because, thanks to its essence (Wesen), it 
participates in the immutability of the essentialities. Essentialities are nei-
ther concepts5, the result of abstraction, nor essences. Human beings cannot 
know the pure simplicity of essentialities, but can grasp it when, by giving 
a name to things, they know them. Through names, in fact, their essence is 
manifested. And the essence is the mediate place between essentiality and 
the real-actual world6.  
According to what we have learned so far about essentialities, 
it appears certain that their essential being (wesenhaftes Sein) 
is the only kind of being they possess. On the other hand as far 
as the essences are concerned they may possess an additional 
actuality in their respective objects, and a relationship to those 
objects whose quid they determine is already implied in their 
pre-actual being. This duality in the being of the essences cor-
responds to the mediating function which they exercise with 
respect to the essentialities, on the one hand, and the “real-ac-
tual world”, on the other7.
3  Ibid., 65. In the footnote 3, the philosopher specifies the difference between intellectus 
and ratio.
4  Ibid., 65.
5  Cf. Ibid., 66: «The danger of mistaking the essence of a concept is even greater. We form 
concepts by bringing into relief certain characteristic marks of an object. We thus have a 
certain amount of freedom in the formation of concepts. Essentialities, on the other hand, 
are not formed by us but rather found discovered». 
6  Cf. Ibid., 79-80. Here, Stein’s metaphysical research is correlated with theological per-
spective: before of the original pity, the human being knew things in their essence and he 
could give them an appropriate name. The Biblical reference is Gn. 2, 19. 
7  Ibid., 84. 
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According to a first definition, following Thomas Aquinas and also 
Husserl’s investigations, essence «[…] is that which determines the “quid” or 
“what” of the object (to ti eh eihai). An “essence-less” (Wesen-los) object is 
therefore inconceivable; without a essence it would no longer be an object, 
but only the empty form of an object»8. A rielaboration of this classic issue 
is fundamental to study a human spiritual dimension. The «double being» 
of essence – Stein writes – corresponding to the «mediate place […] between 
essentialities and the “actual-real world”» can be better understood through 
the distinction between “full quid” and “essential (pure) quid”. The latter 
represents the essential possibility (Wesensmöglichkeit) which is immutable 
and at the same time can only be expressed in the actual-real being. The 
full quid can be caught, however, considering the whole becoming process 
to which every temporal reality is subject to. Stein uses joy as an example: 
The essence and the essential quid (Wesens was) of this (my) joy is 
actual as a whole at every moment of the joy’s (actual-real) duration. 
[…] There is no doubt that the essence of this (my) joy is actual 
only as long as the joy itself is actual (full quid). Prior to the 
actuality, the essence of my joy has no being in the “real world 
[…]. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the essence of my joy is 
not prior to this actuality. Since we are able to grasp its essential 
quid indipendent of its actualisation in its object9.
Essence thus depends on essentiality, through its essential quid – what in 
Medieval tradition was referred to as “universal” –, but also on the object 
it needs to complete itself through the full quid10. According to Stein, a 
discourse on essentialities is to be intended as a reinterpretation of Plato’s 
world of ideas and the universals of Scholasticism, opening the way to 
a comparison with the classic doctrine of exemplarism, from which Stein 
elaborates her own “version” of it11. 
1.2 Essence and singularity
We have said that the human spirit can grasp the meaning of the real only 
through essence, as essence participates in the simplicity of the essentialities. 
We must now ask ourselves if these essentialities are “copies” of real entities. 
Stein’s ontology describes the reality of the world as independent of the 
spiritual-intellectual subject (realism). However, the reality can assume a 
8  Ibid., 70-71. 
9  Ibid., 82-83. 
10  Cf. Ibid., 84 footnote 43: Stein comments the husserlian Wesensanschauung (E. Husserl, 
Ideen I, pp. 8 ss.). She argues that Husserl have not considered this double nature of Wesen. 
11  Cf. Letterio Mauro, «In principio era il senso». L’ordine del mondo in Edith Stein, in «Minima 
metaphisica», Il divino e l’ordine del mondo, a cura di M. Marassi e R. Radice (Milano: Vita e 
Pensiero, 2015).
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meaning when it is known by the spiritual subject12. This is possible thanks 
to the essence of known things and to the essence of the knowing spirit. 
This perspective remains faithful to the noetic-noematic description pro-
posed by phenomenology and it is enriched by the adhesion to Christian 
methaphysics. The universal according to Stein coincides with the essential 
quid – as discussed above – which is neither mere name, nor mere concept. 
It is not an arbitrary result of abstraction, but it can be “found” in objects, 
even independent of their being actual-real. The human being, in fact, 
knows things «as such» because he can “find” in them their own meaning 
thanks to his spiritual being, which is individually connotated. The material 
world is thus intentionally grasped and understood according to a specific 
“scale of values”. It is not rational knowing (ratio), but thinking, the work 
of intellect (intellectus)13. The known world is independent of the knower, 
but the latter, operating intentionally on the world, “provides meaning”. 
The human knowing process cannot however be described as autonomous, 
because to receive the essence in the meaning of things is not the same as 
to perceive it in its purity and simplicity, namely in its essentialities; the 
human being does not see things as they are themselves but he can under-
stand their meaning14. These observations lead to the recognition of an 
eternal foundation outside time, and belonging to the field of essentiality. 
The Greek expression tò tì en einai can be translated as “to be that which 
was” in its essence. «Whatever essentiality is immutably what it was», 
writes Stein. «Said more precisely, the difference between present, past, 
and future is suspended here. Whatever is essentially does not enter into 
existence; it is, not as from moment to moment wrested from the naught, 
it is not temporal. But because it is independent of time, it is also in every 
instant»15. It is apparent how Stein adheres to tradition which, through 
Plato, Augustine and Thomas16, deals with the topic of the exemplarism, 
avoiding hypostatization and so duplicity between archetype and things. 
The archetype (or essentiality) is not something different from real-actual 
being: it is its most authentic actuation, it is what it ought (was destined) 
to be17. Later, this gnoseological and ontological argument will assume a 
moral meaning. 
12  Cf. Stein 2002, 85-90.
13  This difference is typical of Christian metaphysical thought (for instance Thomas 
Aquinas, Bonaventure and Nicholas of Cusa) and it is shared by Stein. Then, in the conte-
porary philosophy the theme is studied also by Heidegger, which he uses the terms Wissen 
and Denken. Cf. Giuseppe Barzaghi, Lo sguardo di Dio. Saggi di teologia anagogica (Siena: 
Edizione Cantagalli, 2003), 96 e ss.
14  Cf. Stein 2002, 70-71.
15  Ibid., 93.
16  Stein refers to Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de Potentia, q. 3, a. 5 and 
Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate, q. 3, a. 1 corp. 
17  Cf. Stein 2002, 303-304.
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2. Theory of being [Seinslehre]
2.1 Essence, existence, creation
As we have shown, the topic of essences and essentialities leads Stein to 
refuse the “dualistic” interpretation of Plato’s doctrine of ideas18. To clar-
ify this point and avoid such criticism – which Aristotle made to Plato - is 
no easy task.  However, Stein repeatedly emphasizes that she is not sure 
Aristotle correctly understood his Master. Ideas are not things, but they are 
truer that every entity (malloh ohta): 
[…] the ideas cannot be anything but “true”.  - she writes – […] 
Ideas are what they are, and they are manifest to the divine 
spirit. […] ideas are nothing but the divine spirit itself, which 
as such is completely manifest or intelligible to itself.19
Here it is clear that the Stein’s philosophical perspective is related to the 
Revelation. In this light, in fact, Stein’s elaboration of the problem of essence 
is particularly interesting. This theme is not merely used in a gnoseological 
context to explain the dynamyc of the human knowledge, but constitutes 
the ontological framework within which it is possible to comprhend Stein’s 
anthropological and moral perspective. The question about the “meaning of 
the reality” is the framework within which the doctrine of the Wesenheiten 
should be placed. It is not enough to describe how it is possible to know 
something - the question becomes “why that thing is” and “what is its 
origin”. From here, the philosophical necessity to encompass the issue of 
analogy, between human beings and their Principle. Plato’s ideas remain 
an important reference point. However, the idea of creation was still foreign 
to Plato. Stein’s metaphysics, on the contrary, does discuss the problem of 
unity-multiplicity within the context of creationism20. The philosophical 
reason behind drawing from the Holy Scriptures is also in the metaphysical 
question which Heidegger brought to the attention of his contemporaries: 
“why being and not nothing?”21. However, Stein’s answer is completely 
different from Heidegger’s. In fact a phenomenological investigation on 
18  Like Thomas, Stein is thoroughly convinced that there are real intelligible structure 
and Plato’s doctrine of ideas was in this perspective. Cf. ibid., chap. IV, § 4, 3.
19  Cf. ibid., 306. 
20  Cf. ibid., 308: «the attempt to harmonize the simplicity of the divine being with the 
manifold of the ideas bears the marks of the reason illumined by faith, a reason which – 
impelled the words of revealed truth – seeks to grasp mysteries which defy and confound 
all human concepts». 
21  Cf. ibid., pp. 325-331. «We can conceptually conceive of the nought, buti t is not a 
“structure” [Gebilde]. It is without content and thus without an essence. It cannot even be 
called an empty form, but merely the annulment, negation, or crossing out of an empty form, 
namely, of the form of a something. The nought evinces the the incapability of thought to 
generate by itself “something that does not rest on an already given reality».
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the Ego leads her to seek perspectives of meanings capable to explain its 
origin. The actual life of the pure Ego flows from one lived experience to 
the other and it cannot be independent, she writes. It needs a foundation22. 
Thus it is through a phenomenological analysis that Stein recognizes the 
Eternal Being, the Creator, as the measure of being of each and every Ego. 
So, Husserl’s discourse on essence is synthetically connected to that on 
existence and to the question about origin.  In this context, Stein’s doctrine 
of essentiality [Wesenheiten] provides a philosophical contribution to the 
theological problem of Creation. 
2.2 From essence to existence
Among the different meanings of ens, which Stein analyzes in detail 
from the Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions23, the most important one 
is that used to indicate “something which is”. We thus reach the question 
of existence (Existenz)24. The need for completeness in Stein’s investigation 
on being allows her to point out the mutual dependence between essential 
dimension and existential dimension. The essential quid of every thing 
is before the real-actual being25, but such quid can be determined only in 
synthesis with the real being (from potency to act)26. An investigation on 
existence cannot thus be avoided. The main purpose of research is, in fact, 
to reach an understanding of the world of experience in its real multiplicity. 
According to Stein, the need to understand this fullness of being starts from 
the experience of the real, but it refers back to essentialities, which, as we 
have seen, are not an arbitrary result of abstraction. Stein writes: «Being 
is one, and all that which is shares in it. Its full meaning corresponds to the 
fullness of all existents. And when we speak of being, we mean this total full-
ness. No finite intellect, however, is ever capable of enclosing this fullness 
in the unity of a fulfilled apperception. To approximate the apperception 
of this fullness is the infinite task and goal of human knowledge»27. Using 
the analogy of proportionality (analogia proportionis)28 – like Thomas –  “being” 
can be said analogically, albeit different. We shall not here discuss in detail 
Stein’s arguments on analogy, but this perspective allows us to understand a 
nodal point. Stein reflects on the passage from the Bible in which God says “I 
22  Cf. E. Stein, Potenz und Akt: Studien zu einer Philosophie des Seins, ESGA 10, (Freiburg in 
Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 2005), 14: «Es ist für das fließende Leben etwas da, was ihm “zu 
Grunde liegt”, was es trägt – eine Substanz». 
23  Cf. Stein 2002, chap. IV, §2, 11.
24  Cfr., ibid., 354.
25  Cf. ibid., 325-331.
26  Cf. ibid., 333.
27  Ibid., 332.
28  Cf., ibid., 335: here Stein distinguishes between aristotelic analogia entis and thomistic 
analogia proportionis. 
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am who I am”29. The very name of God, “I am”, expresses His total fullness 
of being with no need of further attributes. It allows us to understand that 
unity beyond time in which there is no difference between name, meaning 
and reality. The name of God is fullness of meaning, and can be expressed 
only as a verb: “I am” (sum). «God’s “I am” is an eternally living presence, 
without beginning and without end, without any voids and without any 
darkness»30. For analogy the human spiritual being has the possibility to 
define himself as “I”. Only a human being, in fact, can think himself as a 
single individual and can describe himself using such word, which however 
needs to be specified through a number of predicates and becomes in time. 
The word “I” in this case is a sign of conscious and spiritual life, albeit not 
coinciding with the real fullness of its being. The life of the I is in fact is 
present in every moment, but it is “filled” with contents which differ from 
moment to moment, forming a multiplicity of becoming lived experiences. 
«And thus we see that while the being of the I is separated from divine 
being by an infinite distance, it nevertheless – owing to the fact that it is an 
I, i.e., a person – bears a closer resemblance to divine being that anything 
else that lies within the reach of our experience»31. 
3. “Moral interiority”
3.1 The human spirit as self-knowledge
How can we interpret this analogical relationship? We would like to 
focus on what we shall call “moral interiority”, having its apex in Christ. In 
fact, the augustinian issue of interiority seems to be the best way to describe 
man’s capability to access his inner self and know it. Such inward “opening” 
is what characterizes the spiritual dimension of human beings32 and seems to 
be their maior simitudo with the Creator. If the human soul is spirit according 
to its most intimate essence, it is by looking at its spiritual determination 
that we can discover its analogy with God, pure Spirit33. The human being, 
as we have said, is spiritual because is capable of comprehending reality 
and of knowing himself (memory)34, and he can act freely (will). The phe-
nomenological investigation is enriched with Augustine’s description of 
the spirit (mens in Latin) as memory, intellect and will. Phenomenology 
29  Cf. Es 3, 14.
30  Stein 2002, 344.
31  Ibid., 344.
32  Cf. Edith Stein, Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person. Vorlesungen zur philosophischen 
Anthropologie, ESGA 14 (Freiburg im Breisgau, Verlag Herder, 2010), 78: «Wir sagen dafür 
auch: eine freie geistige Person. Person sein heißt, ein freies und geistiges Wesen sein. Daß 
der Mensch Person ist, das unterscheidet ihn von allen Naturwesen».
33  Cf. Stein 2002, 460. 
34  Cf., ibid., 362.
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defines spiritual life as an “intentional movement” by which the subject 
looks at an object35 and considers it according to a specific meaning content 
(Sinnesgehalt)36, through the essentialities. According to Stein, this human 
spiritual knowledge is toward the external world and then it is toward the 
inner world. So thanks to his spiritual being, man can look also inwards - in 
interioritate – and know himself. It is not psychic consciousness (reflective), 
but rather spiritual self-knowledge; it is a pre-reflective “original conscious-
ness”. Stein writes:
We shall confine our inquiry to the inner world of the ego. 
And this means in the present context not only the conscious 
ego-life – the present ego-life of past and future, to the extent 
that they are accessible by reaching backward and forward in 
memory and anticipation (i.e., the unity of the stream of experi-
ences [Erlebnisstrom]) – but also that which is not immediately 
conscious, that out of which conscious life arise37. 
This access that the human spirit has to its own interiority is not always 
actual and is of the same nature as Husserl’s internal perception. It is com-
pletely different from the consciousness that accompanies the pure Ego38 - it 
is not always immediately present and is pre-reflective: stored in memory, 
it forms a collection of experiences allowing for “self-knowledge”39. This 
spiritual self-knowledge capacity – i.e. interiority – is however limited, as 
it is not totally clear to oneself. Indeed the spiritual soul is characterized by 
interior light and darkness, similar to «a lighted surface over a dark abyss»40. 
3.2 The human spirit as will 
The spiritual life, as we have seen, is intellectual knowledge through 
essence and essentialities, it is self-knowledge, namely interiority, and 
finally it is free will41.  Thanks to the latter, the subject can be defined as 
35  Cf. Edith Stein, Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der 
Geisteswissenschaften, ESGA 6 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2010), cit., 64 ss.
36  In the phenomenological description, the spiritual capacity to grasp intentionally an 
object it’s thanks to the “motivation”. Cf. Stein 2002, chap. IV, §3, 20 e §4, 8. 
37  Stein 2002, 388.
38  About “interior perception” see Stein 2002, 374-376.
39  Cf. ibid., 500-501. 
40  Stein 2002, 365.
41  Ibid., 372: «The realm of spiritual life is the authentic realm of freedom. Here the I can 
be genuinely creative out of the depth of its own self. What we call free acts – a firm resolve, 
the voluntary inception and execution of some action, the explicit turning toward a “ris-
ing” thought, the conscious termination of a succession of idea sas well as all questioning, 
demanding, granding, promising, commanding, obeyding- are deeds” of the I, manifold 
in their meaning and inner structure, but uniform in one respect. In all of these deeds the I 
determines the content or direction of its own being […]. This does not mean, of course, that 
M a r t i n a  G a l v a n i
64
a “person”42. He can freely choose how to act and thus pronounce his 
fiat. This ethics issue, about appetitive faculty43, is discussed by Stein in 
her anthropological description, which we can define as phenomenologi-
cal-metaphysical. According to Stein, this faculty is oriented towards good. 
The desire for good which is characteristic of the spiritual dimension is 
explained starting from the thomistic discussion on transcendentals, espe-
cially the transcendental bonum. Willing the good implies knowledge; what 
is willed is known, and therefore true44. Bonum and verum are closely related 
and – like in Thomism – they impart perfection to the existent (ens)45. As we 
have seen, the spirit can understand reality because it grasp its essence, and 
thus essentiality. We are back to the topic of archetypes, to be understood 
not as something different from the real-actual being, but rather as the 
existent in its actualization: “the existent as it should be”46. The cognitive 
faculty (intellect) and the appetitive faculty (will) are seen in their mutual 
determination and the classic theory of transcendentals is integrated with 
the contemporary moral “value theory”. Stein writes: «[…] which we 
call value belongs to the realm of essential being. It is pre-designed from 
eternity not only what an existent (ens) is, considered in itself, but also 
what significance, i.e., what value, attaches to it in the total context of all 
existents»47. Here, we can see clearly the methaphysical origin of Stein’s 
moral perspective, which we have tried to discuss synthetically with her 
anthropological investigation about the human spiritual dimension. The 
question behind Stein’s work – the meaning of being – is not disconnected 
from her reflection on moral acting. The human being, thanks to his appeti-
tive faculty, tends to improvement and his acting is part of his being: «The 
effects (i.e., the resultant quid of the efficacious activity), however, depend 
on what the existents are»48. The human beings, as real-actual existent, are 
subject to becoming and, acting freely, can tend to the realization of what 
they are essentially. Unlike the pure Act, in them being and acting do not 
coincide, but there are potentialities in interioritate which can be realized in 
in these deeds the I becomes […] the creator of its own self. The I has received the freedom 
of self-determination as a gift».
42  Cf. Stein 2002, 366-367.
43  Cf. Angela Ales Bello, Edith Stein: lo spirito umano in cammino verso la santità, in AA. 
VV., Edith Stein. Lo spirito e la santità, a cura di Michele D’Ambra, (Roma: Edizioni OCD, 
2007), 15: «Il regno dello spirito è il regno degli atti liberi, quegli atti caratterizzati dal fiat, 
che implicano una decisione e una presa di posizione. Si entra nella sfera del volere e dell’a-
gire, lontana da ogni determinismo, nella quale si può “agire” o “tralasciare”, ed è qui che 
si innesta la vita etica e la scelta morale».
44  Cf. ibid., 312. 
45  Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Q. de Veritate, cit., q. 21, a. 1 e a. 3.
46  About this theme, Stein describes the difference between human being and angelic 
creature. Cf. Stein 2002, chap. VII, §5.
47  Stein 2002, 316. 
48  Stein 2002, 316.
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time49. In this sense, we have use the word “moral interiority” to indicate 
the person as capable of seeing and realizing what he is essentially. Only as 
free to “create” his life can the subject be defined as a person. This freedom 
of self-determination is however a gift that man has received and that can 
be developed in any freely chosen direction. 
4. Deus Trinitas as the apex of moral love 
We have seen that man is an actual-real person: his essence can be freely 
actuated in existence, in a temporal process. However, what is actuated 
in such process is since eternity. We have finally explained this apparent 
contradiction. With Stein, we can say that the meaning, completed through 
this becoming process, is fully contained in the Logos, beginning and origin 
of this fullness of meaning. No contingent entity can exist outside the abso-
lute and eternal Being – it would be a logical contradiction. The temporal 
becoming of the real being, and therefore of human existence, is based upon 
what Stein called “the realm of meaning”50 to which every meaningful unit 
belongs. These units, however, receive meaning as a gift in the creative 
act, that is not temporal. Since in God being and acting coincide, there is 
no beginning in the creation act. It cannot be conceived with the temporal 
categories which characterize human production. Created beings are called 
into existence in time, but they are in their meaningfulness since eternity, 
according to their essentiality. From this point of view, Stein interprets 
the first verse of the Prologue to St. John’s Gospel as “in the beginning 
was the meaning (Im Anfang war der Sinn)51”. And then: “through him all 
things came into being”52. The generation of the Word through the Father 
expresses His real-actual being. In fact, Logos is a real person. However, 
His existing is not separated from His essential being, since in Him there 
is no beginning. This generating act, which is eternal and in God Himself, 
already contains the whole creation; there is no before or after. The arche-
type problem, again. How can we solve it? What role should this topic play 
in the moral perspective we have outlined? This passage of the Scriptures, 
says Stein, prompts us to return to Augustine’s theory of ideas as “creative 
essentialities in the spirit of God”. 
How is the con-stare of things, their subsisting or being alive in the 
Logos, to be understood? It has been pointed out that it cannot be 
understood as their actual being. […].The name Logos seems to 
indicate that what is meant might be the essential being of things, 
49  Cf. ibid., 376.
50 Cf. ibid., 150.
51  Der Sinn is often traslated as “meaningful existence” (cf. Stein 2002, 106).
52  Cf. John 1, 1-18.
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that the meaning of things (which we have previously charac-
terized as “not-become” [ungervworden])might have its habitat 
in the divine Logos. That which from eternity subsists a compo-
nent part [Glied] of the divine plan of Creation is “imparted” 
to things as their meaning and is actualized in them53. 
The creative essentialities are in Him, because “through him all things 
came into being”. The interpretation of the above passages, however, should 
not lead us to posit that essentialities in the Logos are previous to their 
realization hic et nunc. Essentialities are in fact already real-actual in Him, 
ab eterno. In this sense, they are defined by Stein “creative archetypes”. She 
writes: «the being of the finite in the eternal carries a twofold meaning: 1) 
a being-encompassed of all finite things by the divine spirit and 2) a causal 
being-founded on all finite things in the divine essence»54. These consid-
erations lead to the problem of individuation, which we cannot examine 
here – it would carry us beyond the topic of “moral interiority”. However, 
we would like to note that, if the individual essence has a twofold aspect 
– essential quid and full quid – it could be a good starting point to try and 
solve the apparent contradiction between unity and multiplicity. Essence 
is the quid of each actual-real entity (full quid), and at the same time is con-
tained in the Logos since, participating in essentiality, is in the Logos as not 
other from Him, and at the same time with its specific individual being. 
According to Stein, from this point, it is possible to enter the mystery of the 
twofold Revelation of the Logos: in the incarnate Word and in the created 
world55. The Word, i.e. Christ, becomes therefore the only possible arche-
type, for each acting which is already being. He is the medium who solves 
the seeming contradiction between One and many. If the creative archetype 
is the actual-real being “as it should be”, since it is its origin and thus its 
most authentic being (1) and if such archetype is present since eternity in 
the Logos made flesh in Christ (2) then the “model” of each acting can only 
be the living God made human. No ethical argument is therefore possible 
outside the imitatio Christi as a moral model. What we have called “moral 
interiority” is the way individuals try to realize at best their essential quid. 
This is possible only through self-actualization, thanks to the love which 
originates in the Word made human. What can be realized morally, is in 
the individual’s interiority – what Augustine called the place of eternal 
truths – what can be realized morally. The path to impart perfection to 
oneself – the natural pining for good characteristic of appetitive faculty – 
is in free human action, preceded by knowledge and expressed with love. 
This ethics perspective, metaphysically and theologically founded, finds its 
explanation in the mystery of the Trinity. Only with the Trinity as a model 
53  Ibid., 114.
54  Ibid., 116 (my translation).
55  Cf. ibid., chap. III, §12.
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can we understand ethical life as the realization of love, says Stein56. Indeed, 
the relation between a finite “I” and a finite “you” can only be imperfect, 
since in the “we” there is an irresolvable difference of essential and exis-
tential. It is not so in the Trinity, three People linked by a perfect identity 
of essence. The “we”, in the Trinity, is relation between People and at the 
same time full unity57. Here, the relation is a total love gift, where the I gives 
itself totally to the you in the act through which the Father generates the 
Son and breathes with Him the Holy Spirit. It is a mutual gift of a single 
eternal infinite essence between Divine People. Stein writes: «This essence 
and being the Father gives from eternity to the Son by generating him, and 
from this gift proceeds, as the fruit of mutual love, the Holy Spirit»58. 
To conclude we can say that thanks to the fact that he is a spiritual creature 
and can open himself to himself59, man can intellectually grasp the meaning 
of reality and act in it. Following Augustine, Stein perceives this original 
consciousness of oneself (interiority) as “an inner place, not a place” (“inte-
riore loco, non loco”), the starting point for an explanation of intellective 
knowledge, but especially the free acting and consequently ethics and, 
consequently, ethics. 
Action is not just expressed outwards: it is first of all self-actuation. 
Acting and being are mutually implied. The direction of moral actions – as 
will of perfection – is thus already present in the essence of each individual 
and this essence, thanks to the creative essentiality, is ab eterno in the Logos. 
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